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ADVICE TO CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHERS
Alvin Planting a
I. Introduction
Christianity, these days, and in our part of the world, is on the move. There are
many signs pointing in this direction: the growth of Christian schools, of the serious conservative Christian denominations, the furor over prayer in public schools,
the creationism/evolution controversy, and others.
There is also powerful evidence for this contention in philosophy. Thirty or
thirty-five years ago, the public temper of mainline establishment philosophy in
the English speaking world was deeply non-Christian. Few establishment
philosophers were Christian; even fewer were willing to admit in public that they
were, and still fewer thought of their being Christian as making a real difference to
their practice as philosophers. The most popular question of philosophical theology, at that time, was not whether Christianity or theism is true; the question, instead, was whether it even makes sense to say that there is such a person as God.
According to the logical positivism then running riot, the sentence "there is such a
person as God" literally makes no sense; it is disguised nonsense; it altogether fails
to express a thought or a proposition. The central question wasn't whether theism
is true; it was whether there is such a thing as theism-a genuine factual claim that
is either true or false--at all. But things have changed. There are now many more
Christians and many more unabashed Christians in the professional mainstream of
American philosophical life. For example, the foundation of the Society for Christian Philosophers, an organization to promote fellowship and exchange of ideas
among Christian philosophers, is both an evidence and a consequence of that fact.
Founded some six years ago, it is now a thriving organization with regional meetings in every part of the country; its members are deeply involved in American professional philosophical life. So Christianity is on the move, and on the move in
philosophy, as well as in other areas of intellectual life.
But even if Christianity is on the move, it has taken only a few brief steps;
and it is marching through largely alien territory. For the intellectual culture of
our day is for the most part profoundly nontheistic and hence non-Christian-more
than that, it is anti-theistic. Most of the so-called human sciences, much of the
non-human sciences, most of non-scientific intellectual endeavor and even a
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good bit of allegedly Christian theology is animated by a spirit wholly foreign to
that of Christian theism. I don't have the space here to elaborate and develop this
point; but I don't have to, for it is familiar to you all. To return to philosophy: most
of the major philosophy departments in America have next to nothing to offer the
student intent on coming to see how to be a Christian in philosophy-how to assess
and develop the bearing of Christianity on matters of current philosophical concern, and how to think about those philosophical matters of interest to the Christian
community. In the typical graduate philosophy department there will be little
more, along these lines, than a course in philosophy of religion in which it is
suggested that the evidence for the existence of God-the classical theistic proofs,
say-is at least counterbalanced by the evidence against the existence of God-the
problem of evil, perhaps; and it may then be added that the wisest course, in view
of such maxims as Ockham' s Razor, is to dispense with the whole idea of God, at
least for philosophical purposes.
My aim, in this talk, is to give some advice to philosophers who are Christians.
And although my advice is directed specifically to Christian philosophers, it is relevant to all philosophers who believe in God, whether Christian, Jewish or Moslem. I propose to give some advice to the Christian or theistic philosophical community: some advice relevant to the situation in which in fact we find ourselves.
"Who are you," you say, "to give the rest of us advice?" That's a good question. I
shall deal with it as one properly deals with good questions to which one doesn't
know the answer: I shall ignore it. My counsel can be summed up on two connected suggestions, along with a codicil. First, Christian philosophers and Christian intellectuals generally must display more autonomy-more independence of
the rest of the philosophical world. Second, Christian philosophers must display
more integrity-integrity in the sense of integral wholeness, or oneness, or unity,
being all of one piece. Perhaps 'integrality' would be the better word here. And
necessary to these two is a third: Christian courage, or boldness, or strength, or
perhaps Christian self-confidence. We Christian philosophers must display more
faith, more trust in the Lord; we must put on the whole armor of God. Let me explain in a brief and preliminary way what I have in mind; then I shall go on to consider some examples in more detail.
Consider a Christian college student-from Grand Rapids, Michigan, say, or
Arkadelphia, Arkansas-who decides philosophy is the subject for her. Naturally
enough, she will go to graduate school to learn how to become a philosopher.
Perhaps she goes to Princeton, or Berkeley, or Pittsburgh, or Arizona; it doesn't
much matter which. There she learns how philosophy is presently practiced. The
burning questions of the day are such topics as the new theory of reference; the
realism/anti-realism controversy; the problems with probability; Quine's claims
about the radical indeterminacy of translation; Rawls on justice; the causal theory
of knowledge; Gettier problems; the artificial intelligence model for the under-
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standing of what it is to be a person; the question of the ontological status of unobservable entities in science; whether there is genuine objectivity in science or anywhere else; whether mathematics can be reduced to set theory and whether abstract
entities generally-numbers, propositions, properties--can be, as we quaintly
say, "dispensed with"; whether possible worlds are abstract or concrete; whether
our assertions are best seen as mere moves in a language game or as attempts to
state the sober truth about the world; whether the rational egoist can be shown to be
irrational, and all the rest. It is then natural for her, after she gets her Ph.D., to continue to think about and work on these topics. And it is natural, furthermore, for
her to work on them in the way she was taught to, thinking about them in the light
of the assumptions made by her mentors and in terms of currently accepted ideas as
to what a philosopher should start from or take for granted, what requires argument
and defense, and what a satisfying philosophical explanation or a proper resolution
to a philosophical question is like. She will be uneasy about departing widely from
these topics and assumptions, feeling instinctively that any such departures are at
best marginally respectable. Philosophy is a social enterprise; and our standards
and assumptions-the paramenters within which we practice our craft-are set by
our mentors and by the great contemporary centers of philosophy.
From one point of view this is natural and proper; from another, however, it is
profoundly unsatisfactory. The questions I mentioned are important and interesting. Christian philosophers, however, are the philosophers of the Christian community; and it is part of their task as Christian philosophers to serve the Christian
community. But the Christian community has its own questions, its own concerns,
its own topics for investigation, its own agenda and its own research program.
Christian philosophers ought not merely take their inspiration from what's going
on at Princeton or Berkeley or Harvard, attractive and scintillating as that may be;
for perhaps those questions and topics are not the ones, or not the only ones, they
should be thinking about as the philosophers of the Christian community. There
are other philosopical topics the Christian community must work at, and other topics the Christian community must work at philosophically. And obviously,
Christian philosophers are the ones who must do the philosophical work involved.
If they devote their best efforts to the topics fashionable in the non-Christian
philosophical world, they will neglect a crucial and central part of their task as
Christian philosophers. What is needed here is more independence, more autonomy with respect to the projects and concerns of the non-theistic philosophical
world.
But something else is at least as important here. Suppose the student I mentioned
above goes to Harvard; she studies with Willard van Orman Quine. She finds herself attracted to Quine's programs and procedures: his radical empiricism, his allegiance to natural science, his inclination towards behaviorism, his uncompromising naturalism, and his taste for desert landscapes and ontological par-
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simony. It would be wholly natural for her to become totally involved in these projects and programs, to come to think of fruitful and worthwhile philosophy as substantially circumscribed by them. Of course she will note certain tensions between
her Christian belief and her way of practicing philosophy; and she may then bend
her efforts to putting the two together, to harmonizing them. She may devote her
time and energy to seeing how one might understand or reinterpret Christian belief
in such a way as to be palatable to the Quinian. One philosopher I know, embarking on just such a project, suggested that Christians should think of God as a set
(Quine is prepared to countenance sets): the set of all true propositions, perhaps, or
the set of right actions, or the union of those sets, or perhaps their Cartesian product. This is understandable; but it is also profoundly misdirected. Quine is a marvelously gifted philosopher: a subtle, original and powerful philosophical force.
But his fundamental commitments, his fundamental projects and concerns, are
wholly different from those of the Christian community-wholly different and, indeed, antithetical to them. And the result of attempting to graft Christian thought
onto his basic view of the world will be at best an unintegral pastiche; at worst it
will seriously compromise, or distort, or trivialize the claims of Christian theism.
What is needed here is more wholeness, more integrality.
So the Christian philosopher has his own topics and projects to think about; and
when he thinks about the topics of current concern in the broader philosophical
world, he will think about them in his own way, which may be a different way. He
may have to reject certain currently fashionable assumptions about the philosophic
enterprise-he may have to reject widely accepted assumptions as to what are the
proper starting points and procedures for philosophical endeavor. And-and this is
crucially important-the Christian philosopher has a perfect right to the point of
view and pre-philosophical assumptions he brings to philosophic work; the fact
that these are not widely shared outside the Christian or theistic community is interesting but fundamentally irrelevant. I can best explain what I mean by way of
example; so I shall dec end from the level oflofty generality to specific examples.
II. Theism and Verifiability

First, the dreaded "Verifiability Criterion of Meaning." During the palmy days
of logical positivism, some thirty or forty years ago, the positivists claimed that
most of the sentences Christians characteristically utter-"God loves us," for
example, or "God created the heavens and the earth"~on't even have the grace to
be false; they are, said the positivists, literally meaningless. It is not that they express false propositions; they don't express any propositions at all. Like that lovely
line from Alice in Wonderland, ''Twas brillig, and the slithy toves did gyre and
gymbol in the wabe," they say nothing false, but only because they say nothing at
all; they are "cognitively meaningless," to use the positivist's charming phrase.
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The sorts of things theists and others had been saying for centuries, they said, were
now shown to be without sense; we theists had all been the victims, it seems, of a
cruel hoax-perpetrated, perhaps, by ambitious priests and foisted upon us by our
own credulous natures.
Now if this is true, it is indeed important. How had the positivists come by this
startling piece of intelligence? They inferred it from the Verifiability Criterion of
Meaning, which said, roughly, that a sentence is meaningful only if either it is analytic, or its truth or falsehood can be determined by empirical or scientific investigation-by the methods of the empirical sciences. On these grounds not only
theism and theology, but most of traditional metaphysics and philosophy and
much else besides was declared nonsense, without any literal sense at all. Some
positivists conceded that metaphysics and theology, though strictly meaningless,
might still have a certain limited value. Camap, for example, thought they might
be a kind of music. It isn't known whether he expected theology and metaphysics
to supplant Bach and Mozart, or even Wagner; I myself, however, think they could
nicely supersede rock. Hegel could take the place of The Talking Heads; Immanuel Kant could replace The Beach Boys; and instead of The Grateful Dead we
could have, say, Arthur Schopenhauer.
Positivism had a delicious air of being avant garde and with-it; and many
philosophers found it extremely attractive. Furthermore, many who didn't endorse
it nonetheless entertained it with great hospitality as at the least extremely plausible. As a consequence many philosophers-both Christians and non-Christianssaw here a real challenge and an important danger to Christianity: "The main
danger to theism today," said J. J. C. Smart in 1955, "comes from people who
want to say that 'God exists' and 'God does not exist' are equally absurd." In 1955
New Essays in Philosophical Theology appeared, a volume of essays that was to
set the tone and topics for philosophy of religion for the next decade or more; and
most of this volume was given over to a discussion of the impact of Verificationism
on theism. Many philosophically inclined Christians were disturbed and perplexed
and felt deeply threatened; could it really be true that linguistic philosophers had
somehow discovered that the Christian's most cherished convictions were, in fact,
just meaningless? There was a great deal of anxious hand wringing among
philosophers, either themselves theists or sympathetic to theism. Some suggested,
in the face of positivistic onslaught, that the thing for the Christian community to
do was to fold up its tents and silently slink away, admitting that the verifiability
criterion was probably true. Others conceded that strictly speaking, theism really
is nonsense, but is important nonsense. Still others suggested that the sentences in
question should be reinterpreted in such a way as not to give offense to the
positivists; someone seriously suggested, for example, that Christians resolve,
henceforth, to use the sentence "God exists" to mean "some men and women have
had, and all may have, experiences called 'meeting God' "; he added that when we
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say "God created the world from nothing" what we should mean is "everything we
call 'material' can be used in such a way that it contributes to the well-being of
men." In a different context but the same spirit, Rudolph Bultmann embarked
upon his program of demythologizing Christianity. Traditional supernaturalistic
Christian belief, he said, is "impossible in this age of electric light and the wireless." (One can perhaps imagine an earlier village skeptic taking a similar view of,
say, the tallow candle and the printing press, or perhaps the pine torch and the
papyrus scroll.)
By now, of course, Verificationism has retreated into the obscurity it so richly
deserves; but the moral remains. This hand wringing and those attempts to accommodate the positivist were wholly inappropriate. I realize that hindsight is clearer
than foresight and I do not recount this bit of recent intellectual history in order to
be critical of my elders or to claim that we are wiser than our fathers: what I want
to point out is that we can learn something from the whole nasty incident. For
Christian philosophers should have adopted a quite different attitude towards
positivism and its verifiability criterion. What they should have said to the
positivists is: "Your critierion is mistaken: for such statements as 'God loves us'
and 'God created the heavens and the earth' are clearly meaningful; so if they
aren't verifiable in your sense, then it is false that all and only statements verifiable
in that sense are meaningful." What was needed here was less accommodation to
current fashion and more Christian self-confidence: Christian theism is true; if
Christian theism is true, then the verifiability criterion is false; so the verifiability
criterion is false. Of course, if the verificationists had given cogent arguments for
their criterion, from premises that had some legitimate claim on Christian or theistic thinkers, then perhaps there would have been a problem here for the Christian
philosopher; then we would have been obliged either to agree that Christian theism
is cognitively meaningless, or else revise or reject those premises. But the Verificationists never gave any cogent arguments; indeed, they seldom gave any arguments at all. Some simply trumpeted this principle as a great discovery, and when
challenged, repeated it loudly and slowly; but why should that disturb anyone?
Others proposed it as a definition-a definition of the term "meaningful." Now of
course the positivists had a right to use this term in any way they chose; it's a free
country. But how could their decision to use that term in a particular way show
anything so momentous as that all those who took themselves to be believers in
God were wholly deluded? If I propose to use the term 'Democrat' to mean 'unmitigated scoundrel,' would it follow that Democrats everywhere should hang
their heads in shame? And my point, to repeat myself, is that Christian
philosophers should have displayed more integrity, more independence, less readiness to trim their sails to the prevailing philosophical winds of doctrine, and more
Christian self-confidence.
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III. Theism and Theory of Knowledge
I can best approach my second example by indirection. Many philosophers have
claimed to find a serious problem for theism in the existence of evil, or of the
amount and kinds of evil we do in fact find. Many who claim to find a problem here
for theists have urged the deductive argument from evil: they have claimed that the
existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good God is logically incompatible with the presence of evil in the world-a presence conceded and indeed insisted upon by Christian theists. For their part, theists have argued that there is no
inconsistency here. I think the present consensus, even among those who urge
some form of the argument from evil, is that the deductive form of the argument
from evil is unsuccessful.
More recently, philosophers have claimed that the existence of God, while
perhaps not actually inconsistent with the existence of the amount and kinds of evil
we do in fact find, is at any rate unlikely or improbable with respect to it; that is, the
probability of the existence of God with respect to the evil we find, is less than the
probability, with respect to that same evidence, that there is no God-no omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good Creator. Hence the existence of God is improbable with respect to what we know. But if theistic belief is improbable with respect
to what we know, then, so goes the claim, it is irrational or in any event intellectually second rate to accept it.
Now suppose we briefly examine this claim. The objector holds that
(1) God is the omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good creator of the
world

is improbable or unlikely with respect to
(2) There are 10 13 turps of evil
(where the turp is the basic unit of evil).
I've argued elsewhere l that enormous difficulties beset the claim that (1) is unlikely or improbable given (2). Call that response "the low road reply." Here I want
to pursue what I shall call the high road reply. Suppose we stipulate, for purposes
of argument, that (1) is, in fact, improbable on (2). Let's agree that it is unlikely,
given the existence of 1013 turps of evil, that the world has been created by a God
who is perfect in power, knowledge and goodness. What is supposed to follow
from that? How is that to be construed as an objection to theistic belief? How does
the objector's argument go from there? It doesn't follow, of course, that theism is
false. Nor does it follow that one who accepts both (1) and (2) (and let's add, recognizes that (1) is improbable with repect to (2» has an irrational system of beliefs
or is in any way guilty of noetic impropriety; obviously there might be pairs of
propositions A and B, such that we know both A and B, despite the fact that A is im-
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probable on B. I might know, for example, both that Feike is a Frisian and 9 out of
10 Frisians can't swim, and also that Feike can swim; then I am obviously within
my intellectual rights in accepting both these propositions, even though the latter is
improbable with respect to the former. So even if it were a fact that (1) is improbable with respect to (2), that fact, so far, wouldn't be of much consequence. How,
therefore, can this objection be developed?
Presumably what the objector means to hold is that (1) is improbable, not just on
(2) but on some appropriate body of total evidence-perhaps all the evidence the
theist has, or perhaps the body of evidence he is rationally obliged to have. The objector must be supposing that the theist has a relevant body of total evidence here,
a body of evidence that includes (2); and his claim is that (1) is improbable with respect to this relevant body of total evidence. Suppose we say that Ts is the relevant
body of total evidence for a given theist T; and suppose we agree that a belief is rationally acceptable for him only if it is not improbable with respect to Ts- Now what
sorts of propositions are to be found in Ts ? Perhaps the propositions he knows to be
true, or perhaps the largest subset of his beliefs that he can rationally accept without evidence from other propositions, or perhaps the propositions he knows immediately-knows, but does not know on the basis of other propositions. However
exactly we characterize this set Ts ' the question I mean to press is this: why can't
belief in God be itself a member ofTs? Perhaps for the theist-for many theists, at
any rate-belief in God is a member of Ts ' in which case it obviously won't be improbable with respect to Ts. Perhaps the theist has a right to start from belief in
God, taking that proposition to be one of the ones probability with respect to which
determines the rational propriety of other beliefs he holds. But if so, then the
Christian philosopher is entirely within his rights in starting from belief in God to
his philosophizing. He has a right to take the existence of God for granted and go
on from there in his philosophical work-just as other philosophers take for
granted the existence of the past, say, or of other persons, or the basic claims of
contemporary physics.
And this leads me to my point here. Many Christian philosophers appear to think
of themselves qua philosophers as engaged with the atheist and agnostic
philosopher in a common search for the correct philosophical position vis a vis the
question whether there is such a person as God. Of course the Christian
philosopher will have his own private conviction on the point; he will believe, of
course, that indeed there is such a person as God. But he will think, or be inclined
to think, or half inclined to think that as a philosopher he has no right to this position unless he is able to show that it follows from, or is probable, or justified with
respect to premises accepted by all parties to the discussion-theist, agnostic and
atheist alike. Furthermore, he will be half inclined to think he has no right, as a
philosopher, to positions that presuppose the existence of God, if he can't show
that beEef to be justified in this way. What I want to urge is that the Christian
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philosophical community ought not to think of itself as engaged in this common effort to determine the probability or philosophical plausibility of belief in God. The
Christian philosopher quite properly starts from the existence of God, and presupposes it in philosophical work, whether or not he can show it to be probable or
plausible with respect to premises accepted by all philosophers, or most
philosophers, or most philosophers at the great contemporary centers of
philosophy.
Taking it for granted, for example, that there is such a person as God and that we
are indeed within our epistemic rights (are in that sense justified) in believing that
there is, the Christian epistemologist might ask what it is that confers justification
here: by virtue of what is the theist justified? Perhaps there are several sensible responses. One answer he might give and try to develop is that of John Calvin (and
before him, of the Augustinian, Anselmian, Bonaventurian tradition of the middle
ages): God, said Calvin, has implanted in humankind a tendency or nisus or disposition to believe in him:
"There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an
awareness of divinity." This we take to beyond controversy. To prevent
anyone from taking refuge in the pretense of ignorance, God himself has
implanted in all men a certain understanding of his divine majesty ....
Therefore, since from the beginning of the world there has been no region, no city, in short, no household, that could do without religion, there
lies in this a tacit confession of a sense of deity inscribed in the hearts of
all. 2
Calvin's claim, then, is that God has so created us that we have by nature a strong
tendency or inclination or disposition towards belief in him.
Although this disposition to believe in God has been in part smothered or suppressed by sin, it is nevertheless universally present. And it is triggered or actuated
by widely realized conditions:
Lest anyone, then, be excluded from access to happiness, he not only
sowed in men's minds that seed of religion of which we have spoken, but
revealed himself and daily disclosed himself in the whole workmanship
of the universe. As, a consequence, men cannot open their eyes without
being compelled to see him (p. 51).
Like Kant, Calvin is especially impressed in this connection, by the marvelous
compages of the starry heavens above:
Even the common folk and the most untutored, who have been taught
only by the aid of the eyes, cannot be unaware of the excellence of divine
art, for it reveals itself in this innumerable and yet distinct and well-or-
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And now what Calvin says suggests that one who accedes to this tendency and in
these circumstances accepts the belief that God has created the world-perhaps
upon beholding the starry heavens, or the splendid majesty of the mountains, or the
intricate, articulate beauty of a tiny flower-is quite as rational and quite as justified as one who believes that he sees a tree upon having that characteristic beingappeared-to-treely kind of experience.
No doubt this suggestion won't convince the skeptic; taken as an attempt to convince the skeptic it is circular. My point is just this: the Christian has his own questions to answer, and his own projects; these projects may not mesh with those of
the skeptical or unbelieving philosopher. He has his own questions and his own
starting point in investigating these questions. Of course, I don't mean to suggest
that the Christian philosopher must accept Calvin's answer to the question I mentioned above; but I do say it is entirely fitting for him to give to this question an answer that presupposes precisely that of which the skeptic is skeptical-even if this
skepticism is nearly unanimous in most of the prestigious philosophy departments
of our day. The Christian philosopher does indeed have a responsibility to the
philosophical world at large; but his fundamental responsibility is to the Christian
community, and finally to God.
Again, a Christian philosopher may be interested in the relation between faith
and reason, and faith and knowledge: granted that we hold some things by faith and
know other things; granted that we believe that there is such a person as God and
that this belief is true; do we also know that God exists? Do we accept this belief by
faith or by reason? A theist may be inclined towards a reliabilist theory of knowledge; he may be inclined to think that a true belief constitutes knowledge if it is
produced by a reliable belief producing mechanism. (There are hard problems
here, but suppose for now we ignore them.) If the theist thinks God has created us
with the sensus divinitatis Calvin speaks of, he will hold that indeed there is a reliable belief producing mechanism that produces theistic belief; he will thus hold
that we know that God exists. One who follows Calvin here will also hold that a capacity to apprehend God's existence is as much part of our natural noetic or intellectual equipment as is the capacity to apprehend truths of logic, perceptual truths,
truths about the past, and truths about other minds. Belief in the existence of God
is then in the same boat as belief in truths of logic, other minds, the past, and perceptual objects; in each case God has so constructed us that in the right circumstances we acquire the belief in question. But then the belief that there is such
a person as God is as much among the deliverances of our natural noetic faculties
as are those other beliefs. Hence we know that there is such a person as God, and
don't merely believe it; and it isn't by faith that we apprehend the existence of God,
but by reason; and this whether or not any of the classical theistic arguments is successful.
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Now my point is not that Christian philosophers must follow Calvin here. My
point is that the Christian philosoher has a right (I should say a duty) to work at his
own projects-projects set by the beliefs of the Christian community of which he
is a part. The Christian philosophical community must work out the answers to its
questions; and both the questions and the appropriate ways of working out their answers may presuppose beliefs rejected at most of the leading centers of
philosophy. But the Christian is proceeding quite properly in starting from these
beliefs, even if they are so rejected. He is under no obligation to confine his
reasearch projects to those pursued at those centers, or to pursue his own projects
on the basis of the assumptions that prevail there.
Perhaps I can clarify what I want to say by contrasting it with a wholly different
view. According to the theologian David Tracy,
In fact the modem Christian theologian cannot ethically do other than
challenge the traditional self-understanding of the theologian. He no
longer sees his task as a simple defense of or even as an orthodox reinterpretation of traditional belief. Rather, he finds that his ethical commitment to the morality of scientific knowledge forces him to assume a critical posture towards his own and his tradition's beliefs .... In principle,
the fundamental loyalty of the theologian qua theologian is to that morality of scientific knowledge which he shares with his colleagues, the
philosophers, historians and social sciences. No more than they can he
allow his own-or his tradition' s-beliefs to serve as warrants for his arguments. In fact, in all properly theological inquiry, the analysis should
be characterized by those same ethical stances of autonomous judgment,
critical judgment and properly skeptical hard-mindedness that characterizes analysis in other fields. 3
Furthermore, this "morality of scientific knowledge insists that each inquirer
start with the present methods and knowledge of the field in question, unless one
has evidence of the same logical type for rejecting those methods and that knowledge," Still further, "for the new scientific morality, one's fundamental loyalty as
an analyst of any and all cognitive claims is solely to those methodological procedures which the particular scientific community in question has developed" (6).
I say caveat lector. I'm prepared to bet that this "new scientific morality" is like
the Holy Roman Empire: it is neither new nor scientific nor morally obligatory.
Furthermore the "new scientific morality" looks to me to be monumentally inauspicious as a stance for a Christian theologian, modem or otherwise. Even if there
were a set of methodological procedures held in common by most philosophers,
historians and social scientists, or most secular philosophers, historians, and social
scientists, why should a Christian theologian give ultimate allegiance to them
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rather than, say, to God, or to the fundamental truths of Christianity? Tracy's suggestion as to how Christian theologians should proceed seems at best wholly unpromising. Of course I am only a philosopher, not a modem theologian; no doubt
I am venturing beyond my depths. So I don't presume to speak for modem theologians; but however things stand for them, the modem Christian philosopher has a
perfect right, as a philosopher, to start from his belief in God. He has a right to assume it, take it for granted, in his philosophical work-whether or not he can convince his unbelieving colleagues either that this belief is true or that it is sanctioned
by those "methodological procedures" Tracy mentions.
And the Chri stian philosophical community ought to get on with the philosophical questions of importance to the Christian community. It ought to get on with the
project of exploring and developing the implications of Christian theism for the
whole range of questions philosophers ask and answer. It ought to do this whether
or not it can convince the philosophical community at large either that there really
is such a person as God, or that it is rational or reasonable to believe that there is.
Perhaps the Christian philosopher can convince the skeptic or the unbelieving
philosopher that indeed there is such a person as God. Perhaps this is possible in at
least some instances. In other instances, of course, it may be impossible; even if
the skeptic in fact accepts premises from which theistic belief follows by argument
forms he also accepts, he may, when apprised of this situation, give up those premises rather than his unbelief. (In this way it is possible to reduce someone from
knowledge to ignorance by giving him an argument he sees to be valid from premises he knows to be true.)
But whether or not this is possible, the Christian philosopher has other fish to fry
and other questions to think about. Of course he must listen to, understand, and
learn from the broader philosophical community and he must take his place in it;
but his work as a philosopher is not circumscribed by what either the skeptic or the
rest of the philosophical world thinks oftheism.lustifying or trying to justify theistic belief in the eyes of the broader philosophical community is not the only task of
the Christian philosophical community; perhaps it isn't even among its most important tasks. Philosophy is a communal enterprise. The Christian philosopher
who looks exclusively to the philosophical world at large, who thinks of himself as
belonging primarily to that world, runs a two-fold risk. He may neglect an essential part of his task as a Christian philosopher; and he may find himself adopting
principles and procedures that don't comport well with his beliefs as a Christian.
What is needed, once more, is autonomy and integrality.
IV. Theism and Persons
My third example has to do with philosophical anthropology: how should we
think about human persons? What sorts of things, fundamentally, are they? What
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is it to be a person, what is it to be a human person, and how shall we think about
personhood? How, in particular, should Christians, Christian philosophers, think
about these things? The first point to note is that on the Christian scheme of things ,
God is the premier person, the first and chief exemplar of personhood. God, furthermore, has created man in his own image; we men and women are image
bearers of God, and the properties most important for an understanding of our personhood are properties we share with him. How we think about God, then, will
have an immediate and direct bearing on how we think about humankind. Of
course we learn much about ourselves from other sources-from everyday observation, from introspection and self-observation, from scientific investigation and
the like. But it is also perfectly proper to start from what we know as Christians. It
is not the case that rationality, or proper philosophical method, or intellectual responsibility, or the new scientific morality, or whatever, require that we start from
beliefs we share with everyone else-what common sense and current science
teach, e.g.-and attempt to reason to or justify those beliefs we hold as Christians.
In trying to give a satisfying philosophical account of some area or phenomenon,
we may properly appeal, in our account or explanation, to anything else we already
rationally believe-whether it be current science or Christian doctrine.
Let me proceed again to specific examples. There is a fundamental watershed,
in philosophical anthropology, between those who think of human beings as
free-free in the libertarian sense-and those who espouse determinism. According to determinists, every human action is a consequence of initial conditions outside our control by way of causal laws that are also outside our control. Sometimes
underlying this claim is a picture of the universe as a vast machine where, at any
rate at the macroscopic level, all events, including human actions, are determined
by previous events and causal laws. On this view every action I have in fact performed was such that it wasn't within my power to refrain from performing it; and
if, on a given occasion I did not perform a given action, then it wasn't then within
my power to perform it. If I now raise my arm, then, on the view in question, it
wasn't within my power just then not to raise it. Now the Christian thinker has a
stake in this controversy just by virtue of being a Christian. For she will no doubt
believe that God holds us human beings responsible for much of what we do-responsible, and thus properly subject to praise or blame, approval or disapproval.
But how can I be responsible for my actions, if it was never within my power to
perform any action I didn't in fact perform, and never within my power to refrain
from performing any I did perform? If my actions are thus determined, then I am
not rightly or justly held accountable for them; but God does nothing improper or
unjust, and he holds me accountable for some of my actions; hence it is not the case
that all of my actions are thus determined. The Christian has an initially strong
reason to reject the claim that all of our actions are causally determined-a reason
much stronger than the meager and anemic arguments the determinist can muster
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on the other side. Of course if there were powerful arguments on the other side,
then there might be a problem here. But there aren't; so there isn't.
Now the determinist may reply that freedom and causal determinism are, contrary to initial appearances, in fact compatible. He may argue that my being free
with respect to an action I performed at a time t, for example, doesn't entail that it
was then within my power to refrain from performing it, but only something
weaker-perhaps something like ifI had chosen not to perform it, I would not have
performed it. Indeed, the clearheaded compatibilist will go further. He will maintain, not merely that freedom is compatible with determinism, but that freedom requires determinism. He will hold with Hume that the proposition Sis free with respect to action A or S does Afreely entails thatS is causally determined with respect
to A-that there are causal laws and antecedent conditions that together entail
either that S performs A or that S does not perform A. And he will back up this claim
by insisting that if S is not thus determined with respect to A, then it's merely a matter of chance-due, perhaps, to quantum effects in S's brain-that S doesA. But if
it is just a matter of chance that S does A, then either S doesn't really do A at all, or
at any rate S is not responsible for doing A. If S's doing A is just a matter of chance,
then S's doing A is something that just happens to him; but then it is not really the
case that he performs A-at any rate it is not the case that he is responsible for performing A. And hence freedom, in the sense that is required for responsibility, itself requires determinism.
But the Christian thinker will find this claim monumentally implausible. Presumably the determinist means to hold that what he says characterizes actions generally, not just those of human beings. He will hold that it is a necessary truth that
if an agent isn't caused to perform an action then it is a mere matter of chance that
the agent in question performs the action in question. From a Christian perspective, however, this is wholly incredible. For God performs actions, and performs
free actions; and surely it is not the case that there are causal laws and antecedent
conditions outside his control that determine what he does. On the contrary: God is
the author of the causal laws that do in fact obtain; indeed, perhaps the best way to
think of these causal laws is as records of the ways in which God ordinarily treats
the beings he has created. But of course it is not simply a matter of chance that God
does what he does--creates and upholds the world, let's say, and offers redemption and renewal to his children. So a Christian philosopher has an extremely good
reason for rejected this premise, along with the determinism and compatibilism it
supports.
What is really at stake in this discussion is the notion of agent causation: the notion of a person as an ultimate source of action. According to the friends of agent
causation, some events are caused, not by other events, but by substances, objects-typically personal agents. And at least since the time of David Hume, the
idea of agent causation has been languishing. It is fair to say, I think, that most con-
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temporary philosophers who work in this area either reject agent causation outright
or are at the least extremely suspicious of it. They see causation as a relation among
events; they can understand how one event can cause another event, or how events
of one kind can cause events of another kind. But the idea of aperson, say, causing
an event, seems to them unintelligible, unless it can be analyzed, somehow, in
terms of event causation. It is this devotion to event causation, of course, that explains the claim that if you perform an action but are not caused to do so, then your
performing that action is a matter of chance. For if I hold that all causation in ultimately event causation, then I will suppose that if you perform an action but are not
caused to do so by previous events, then your performing that action isn't caused at
all and is therefore a mere matter of chance. The devotee of event causation, furthermore, will perhaps argue for his position as follows. If such agents as persons
cause effects that take place in the physical world-my body's moving in a certain
way, for example-then these effects must ultimately be caused by volitions or undertakings-which, apparently, are immaterial, unphysical events. He will then
claim that the idea of an immaterial event's having causal efficacy in the physical
world is puzzling or dubious or worse.
But a Christian philosopher will find this argument unimpressive and this devotion to event causation uncongenial. As for the argument, the Christian already and
independently believes that acts of volition have causal efficacy; he believes indeed, that the physical universe owes its very existence to just such volitional
acts-God's undertaking to create it. And as for the devotion to event causation,
the Christian will be, initially, at any rate, strongly inclined to reject the idea that
event causation is primary and agent causation to be explained in terms of it. For he
believes that God does and has done many things: he has created the world; he sustains it in being; he communicates with his children. But it is extraordinarily hard
to see how these truths can be analyzed in terms of causal relations among events.
What events could possibly cause God's creating the world or his undertaking to
create the world? God himself institutes or establishes the causal laws that do in
fact hold; how, then, can we see all the events constituted by his actions as related
to causal laws to earlier events? How could it be that propositions ascribing actions
to him are to be explained in terms of event causation?
Some theistic thinkers have noted this problem and reacted by soft pedalling
God's causal activity, or by impetuously following Kant in declaring that it is of a
wholly different order from that in which we engage, an order beyond our comprehension. I believe this is the wrong response. Why should a Christian
philosopher join in the general obeisance to event causation? It is not as if there are
cogent arguments here. The real force behind this claim is a certain philosophical
way of looking at persons and the world; but this view has no initial plausibility
from a Christian perspective and no compelling argument in its favor.
So on all these disputed points in philosophical anthropology the theist will have
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a strong initial predilection for resolving the dispute in one way rather than
another. He will be inclined to reject compatibilism, to hold that event causation (if
indeed there is such a thing) is to be explained in terms of agent causation, to reject
the idea that if an event isn't caused by other events then its occurrence is a matter
of chance, and to reject the idea that events in the physical world can't be caused by
an agent's undertaking to do something. And my point here is this. The Christian
philosopher is within his right in holding these positions, whether or not he can
convince the rest of a philosophical world and whatever the current philosophical
consensus is, if there is a consensus. But isn't such an appeal to God and his properties, in this philosophical context, a shameless appeal to a deus ex machina?
Surely not. "Philosophy," as Hegel once exclaimed in a rare fit of lucidity, "is
thinking things over." Philosophy is in large part a clarification, systematization,
articulation, relating and deepening of pre-philosophical opinion. We come to
philosophy with a range of opinions about the world and humankind and the place
of the latter in the former; and in philosophy we think about these matters, systematically articulate our views, put together and relate our views on diverse topics, and deepen our views by finding unexpected interconnections and by discovering and answering unanticipated questions. Of course we may come to change
our minds by virtue of philosophical endeavor; we may discover incompatibilities
or other infelicities. But we come to philosophy with pre-philosophical opinions;
we can do no other. And the point is: the Christian has as much right to his prephilosophical opinions as others have to theirs. He needn't try first to 'prove' them
from propositions accepted by, say, the bulk of the non-Christian philosophical
community; and if they are widely rejected as naive, or pre-scientific, or primitive,
or unworthy of "man come of age," that is nothing whatever against them. Of
course if there were genuine and substantial arguments against them from premises
that have some legitimate claim on the Christian philosopher, then he would have
a problem; he would have to make some kind of change somewhere. But in the absence of such arguments-and the absence of such arguments is evident-the
Christian philosophical community, quite properly starts, in philosophy, from
what it believes.
But this means that the Christian philosophical community need not devote all of
its efforts to attempting to refute opposing claims and or to arguing for its own
claims, in each case from premises accepted by the bulk of the philosophical community at large. It ought to do this, indeed, but it ought to do more. For if it does
only this, it will neglect a pressing philosophical task: systematizing, deepening,
clarifying Christian thought on these topics. So here again: my plea is for the
Christian philosopher, the Christian philosophical community, to display, first,
more independence and autonomy: we needn't take as our research projects just
those projects that currently enjoy widespread popularity; we have our own questions to think about. Secondly, we must display more integrity. We must not au-
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tomatically assimilate what is current or fashionable or popular by way of
philosophical opinion and procedures; for much of it comports ill with Christian
ways of thinking. And finally, we must display more Christian self-confidence or
courage or boldness. We have a perfect right to our pre-philosophical views: why,
therefore, should we be intimidated by what the rest of the philosophical world
thinks plausible or implausible?
These, then, are my examples; I could have chosen others. In ethics, for example: perhaps the chief theoretical concern, from the theistic perspective, is the
question how are right and wrong, good and bad, duty, permission and obligation
related to God and to his will and to his creative activity? This question doesn't
arise, naturally enough, from a nontheistic perspective; and so, naturally enough,
nontheist ethicists do not address it. But it is perhaps the most important question
for a Christian ethicist to tackle. I have already spoken about epistemology; let me
mention another example from this area. Epistemologists sometimes worry about
the confluence or lack thereof of epistemic justification, on the one hand, and
truth, or reliability, on the other. Suppose we do the best that can be expected of
us, noetically speaking; suppose we do our intellectual duties and satisfy our intellectual obligations: what guarantee is there that in so doing we shall arrive at the
truth? Is there even any reason for supposing that if we thus satisfy our obligations,
we shall have a better chance of arriving at the truth than if we brazenly flout them?
And where do these intellectual obligations come from? How does it happen that
we have them? Here the theist has, if not a clear set of answers, at any rate clear
suggestions towards a set of answers. Another example: creative antirealism is
presently popular among philosophers; this is the view that it is human behaviorin particular, human thought and language-that is somehow responsible for the
fundamental structure of the world and for the fundamental kinds of entities there
are. From a theistic point of view, however, universal creative anti-realism is at
best a mere impertinence, a piece of laughable bravado. For God, of course, owes
neither his existence nor his properties to us and our ways of thinking; the truth is
just the reverse. And so far as the created universe is concerned, while it indeed
owes its existence and character to activity on the part of a person, that person is
certainly not a human person.
One final example, this time from philosophy of mathematics. Many who think
about sets and their nature are inclined to accept the following ideas. First, no set is
a member of itself. Second, whereas a property has its extension contingently, a
set has its membership essentially. This means that no set could have existed if one
of its members had not, and that no set could have had fewer or different members
from the ones it in fact has. It means, furthermore, that sets are contingent beings;
if Ronald Reagan had not existed, then his unit set would not have existed. And
thirdl y, sets form a sort of iterated structure: at the first level there are sets whose
members are non-sets, at the second level sets whose members are non-sets or first
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level sets; at the third level, sets whose members are non-sets or sets of the first two
levels, and so on. Many are also inclined, with Georg Cantor, to regard sets as collections-as objects whose existence is dependent upon a certain sort of intellectual activity-a collecting or "thinking together" as Cantor put it. If sets were collections of this sort, that would explain their displaying the first three features I
mentioned. But if the collecting or thinking together had to be done by human thinkers, or any finite thinkers, there wouldn't be nearly enough sets-not nearly as
many as we think in fact there are. From a theistic point of view, the natural conclusion is that sets owe their existence to God's thinking things together. The natural explanation of those three features is just that sets are indeed collections~ol
lections collected by God; they are or result from God's thinking things together.
This idea may not be popular at contemporary centers of set theoretical activity;
but that is neither here nor there. Christians, theists, ought to understand sets from
a Christian and theistic point of view. What they believe as theists affords a resource for understanding sets not available to the non-theist; and why shouldn't
they employ it? Perhaps here we could proceed without appealing to what we believe as theists; but why should we, if these beliefs are useful and explanatory? I
could probably get home this evening by hopping on one leg; and conceivably I
could climb Devil's Tower with my feet tied together. But why should I want to?
The Christian or theistic philosopher, therefore, has his own way of working at
his craft. In some cases there are items on his agenda-pressing items-not to be
found on the agenda of the non-theistic philosophical community. In others, items
that are currently fashionable appear of relatively minor interest from a Christian
perspective. In still others, the theist will reject common assumptions and views
about how to start, how to proceed, and what constitutes a good or satisfying answer. In still others the Christian will take for granted and will start from assumptions and premises rejected by the philosophical community at large. Of course I
don't mean for a moment to suggest that Christian philosophers have nothing to
learn from their non-Christian and non-theist colleagues: that would be a piece of
foolish arrogance, utterly belied by the facts of the matter. Nor do I mean to
suggest that Christian philosophers should retreat into their own isolated enclave,
having as little as possible to do with non-theistic philosophers. Of course not!
Christians have much to learn and much of enormous importance to learn by way
of dialogue and discussion with their non-theistic colleagues. Christian
philosophers must be intimately involved in the professional life of the philosophical community at large, both because of what they can learn and because of what
they can contribute. Furthermore, while Christian philosophers need not and ought
not to see themselves as involved, for example, in a common effort to determine
whether there is such a person as God, we are all, theist and non-theist alike, engaged in the common human project of understanding ourselves and the world in
which we find ourselves. If the Christian philosophical community is doing its job
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properly, it will be engaged in a complicated, many-sided dialectical discussion,
making its own contribution to that common human project. It must pay careful attention to other contributions; it must gain a deep understanding of them; it must
learn what it can from them and it must take unbelief with profound seriousness.
All of this is true and all of this is important; but none of it runs counter to what
I have been saying. Philosophy is many things. I said earlier that it is a matter of
systematizing, developing and deepening one's pre-philosophical opinions. It is
that; but it is also an arena for the articulation and interplay of commitments and allegiances fundamentally religious in nature; it is an expression of deep and fundamental perspectives, ways of viewing ourselves and the world and God. The
Christian philosophical community, by virtue of being Christian, is committed to
a broad but specific way of looking at humankind and the world and God. Among
its most important and pressing projects are systematizing, deepening, exploring,
articulating this perspective, and exploring its bearing on the rest of what we think
and do. But then the Christian philosophical community has its own agenda; it
need not and should not automatically take its projects from the list of those currently in favor at the leading contemporary centers of philosophy. Furthermore,
Christian philosophers must be wary about assimilating or accepting presently
popular philosophical ideas and procedures; for many of these have roots that are
deeply anti-Christian. And finally the Christian philosophical community has a
right to its perspectives; it is under no obligation first to show that this perspective
is plausible with respect to what is taken for granted by all philosophers, or most
philosophers, or the leading philosophers of our day.
In sum, we who are Christians and propose to be philosophers must not rest content with being philosophers who happen, incidentally, to be Christians; we must
strive to be Christian philosophers. We must therefore pursue our projects with integrity, independence, and Christian boldness. 4
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